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Torture and the anti-torture movement in
China
As a barometer of a country’s rule of law status, criminal justice re-form is the most important part of China’s recent legal reforms. Themost serious problem with China’s criminal justice system is torture
and coercive confessions, as amply reflected in wrongful conviction cases
(He 2016). As Cui Min (Cui 2003) points out, “[a]lthough confessions elicited
by torture are not always false, wrongful convictions, with no exception, are
all because of torture.” Because almost all of the wrongful convictions iden-
tified so far involved torture and coerced false confessions, (1) China is de-
termined to root out torture from police interrogations and has taken a
series of measures to prevent torture in the criminal process. (2)
Torture was a prevalent practice in the criminal processes of many coun-
tries until recently. As Langbein (1977) points out, in both East and West, in
all ancient autocratic regimes, torture was part of ordinary criminal proce-
dure and was regularly employed to investigate and prosecute routine
crimes before the ordinary courts. In Chinese history, from the Zhou dynasty
(1066-256 BC) to the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), torture was permitted to
be employed against suspects to investigate and prosecute crimes before
the courts (Yan 2004). Furthermore, torture was legalised, well-regulated,
and had to be conducted according to the scope, frequency, and tools ex-
plicitly provided for in ancient Chinese codes. (3) Torture was regarded as a
lawful means of evidence collection in ancient China, and that notion has
lingered in China’s legal culture (Guo 2017a: 39; Guo 2017b: 61).
Modern criminal procedure law has abandoned torture as a lawful means
of evidence collection because it is contrary to the principles of due process
and judicial civilisation. Prevention of torture has been a focus of law re-
forms in China for years. The first Criminal Procedure Law (hereinafter CPL),
enacted in 1979, contained a black letter rule against torture, which states:
“The use of torture or extortion to obtain a confession and the use of
threats, inducement, deception, or other illegal means to collect evidence
is strictly prohibited (…),” and this rule has been retained in three rounds
of substantial revisions to the CPL. (4) Since at least 1997, China has officially
acknowledged that coerced confessions are a problem faced by China’s ju-
dicial process, (5) and the authorities have announced a series of measures
attempting to address it. In particular, following the 1996 CPL, both the
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP)
have issued interpretations to provide concrete circumstances under which
illegally obtained oral evidence, including confessions, should be excluded
as incriminating evidence. The exclusionary rule, the hallmark of the rule of
law against torture in particular and involuntary confessions in general in
liberal democracies, has been firmly established in these judicial interpre-
tations (Lewis 2011; Yi 2015). (6)
Notwithstanding the trumpeted changes in legal rules, however, there
seems to have been little progress in practice until the exposure of a series
of wrongful convictions resulting from torture, which put immense pressure
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1. There are no national statistics on this matter, but all reported wrongful convictions were caused
by extraction of confessions by torture, and there is a consensus among legal academics that tor-
ture and coerced false confessions are among the major causes of wrongful convictions in China. 
2. Anti-torture was one of the focuses in the 2012 Criminal Procedure Law Revision. A series of re-
forms were adopted, including the privilege against self-incrimination, an exclusionary rule against
illegally-obtained evidence, procedural rules to avoid torture outside of detention centres, etc.
China’s determination to root out torture can be seen from all these attempts.
3. 唐律疏议·断狱律之六，八，九，十，十四，十五，二十七 (Tanglü shuyi, Duanyulü zhi liu,
ba, jiu, shi, shisi, shiwu, ershiqi, The Law of the Tang Dynasty, 6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 27).
4. Art. 43 1996 CPL; Art. 50 2012 CPL; Art. 52 2018 CPL.
5. The Government’s willingness to acknowledge the pervasiveness of torture was confirmed when
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) published “刑讯逼供罪” (Xingxun bigong zui, The Crime
of Tortured Confession) in late 1997, which included China’s first public official statistics on crim-
inal cases of tortured confession. It reported an average of 364 cases per year between 1979 and
1989, and upward of 400 cases per year for most years in the 1990s, and included the admission
that 241 persons had been tortured to death over the two-year period 1993-94.
6. Art. 61 SPC Judicial Interpretation (1998) (1998 nian zuigao renmin fayuan sifa jieshi, 1998年最
高人民法院司法解释); Art. 256 SPP Judicial Interpretation (1999) (1999 nian zuigao renmin
jianchayuan sifa jieshi, 1999年最高人民检察院司法解释).
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on the Chinese legislature to continue striving to accomplish this mission
(He 2016). Of the previous anti-torture mechanisms, neither prohibitive
legal rules against torture nor exclusion principles could prevent interroga-
tional torture: in the former case, legal prohibitions were ineffective when
few or no workable sanctions were attached to their violation (Lewis 2011:
670); while in the latter case, the exclusionary principles were not supported
by clear legal rules, and were not otherwise concretised or made operational
by supporting procedures and rules of evidence (Lewis 2011: 667). An ef-
fective anti-torture mechanism is still needed, and in China’s case, exclu-
sionary rules might be an answer.
The establishment of exclusionary rules in
contemporary China
Background
While exclusionary rules may be the most effective instrument to reduce
or prevent the practice of torture in police investigations, it took China more
than two decades to adopt such rules. (7) China signed the 1984 Convention
against Torture on 12 December 1986 and ratified it on 4 October 1988. Al-
though Chinese scholars started to discuss the possibility of adopting exclu-
sionary rules after that, it was not until the twenty-first century that
exclusionary rules were put on the legislative agenda. The 1996 amendments
to the Criminal Procedure Law included very few changes to the evidence
chapter. After the 1996 CPL became effective, quite a few Chinese scholars
embarked on drafting proposals for a separate evidence code. One of the
core evidentiary rules in these proposals is an exclusionary rule against ille-
gally obtained evidence (Chen 2004). Efforts to codify the evidence rules in
China were still premature, as a result of which the project was abandoned.
For a legal system with few evidence rules in law and legal practice, it may
have been too great a departure from mainstream practice to feasibly im-
pose an entire evidence law on legal institutions at that time. However, a
consensus did emerge from the ashes of the evidence law project that China
should adopt more evidentiary rules in an incremental, step-by-step manner.
Considering the prevalence of torture and resulting wrongful convictions in
China, a new evidence law could be developed to govern the criminal pro-
cess. A key agreement is that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is
obviously the most needed evidentiary rule for China, considering the preva-
lence of torture and the resulting wrongful convictions. The Legislative Affairs
Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
(NPC) entrusted the Third Criminal Court of the SPC to draft exclusionary
rules, but it was not until 2010 that exclusionary rules took shape in China. 
The catalyst
Due to divided opinions on how the Chinese exclusionary rules should be
drafted, the SPC delayed enacting the rules until compelled to act when a
series of wrongful conviction cases came to light in 2010. In that sense, the
passing of the exclusionary rules, like China’s criminal justice reform in gen-
eral, has been largely scandal-driven. In May 2010, Zhao Zuohai, a villager
from Henan Province, was exonerated after serving 11 years in prison. He
had been convicted of murdering his fellow villager, Zhao Zhenxiang (not
related), and had been sentenced to death in 1999 with a two-year sus-
pension. Police suspected Zhao Zuohai of murdering Zhao Zhenxiang be-
cause the two Zhaos had been seen quarrelling shortly before Zhao
Zhenxiang’s disappearance. When a headless body was found shortly there-
after, the police arrested Zhao Zuohai and subjected him to physical and
mental abuse for weeks until he finally confessed to the “murder.” (8) But
after more than a decade’s absence, the alleged murder victim, Zhao Zhenx-
iang, returned to their home village to claim social welfare benefits. 
Media coverage of the Zhao Zuohai case aroused great public anger at
police interrogational torture because Zhao Zuohai’s story was not the first
wrongful conviction in which “the dead came back to life.” (9) A series of
such high-profile cases, widely reported in the media and universally con-
demned, revealed the state of affairs in China’s criminal justice system and
the interrogation process. To pacify public anger and restore public confi-
dence in the justice system, on 25 June 2010, China’s Supreme People’s
Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry
of State Security, and Ministry of Justice jointly (10) established “Rules Con-
cerning Questions About Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty
Cases” and “Rules Concerning Questions About Exclusion of Illegal Evidence
in Handling Criminal Cases” (hereinafter the 2010 Exclusionary Rules).
Incorporation into the 2010 CPL
China further revised its Criminal Procedure Law in 2012. The 2012 CPL
not only incorporated the exclusionary rules, but also brought in some new
anti-torture mechanisms. First, China’s criminal procedure law accepts the
privilege against self-incrimination (Lewis 2011: 642), a doctrine that has
been commonly accepted in mature legal systems. While it is undoubtedly
a significant improvement in legally prohibiting the police from forcing sus-
pects to incriminate themselves, it represents a compromise between the
police, who are hostile to granting further rights to suspects, and defence
lawyers and the larger legal community. The compromise is that, while the
privilege against self-incrimination is accepted as part of the Chinese crim-
inal procedure law, suspects continue to be denied the right to remain silent
during police interrogation. Chinese legal academics and, to a lesser degree,
legal reformers, have struggled for the right to remain silent for years (Ahl
2016: 143; Lewis 2011: 687), but the police strongly object to this reform
due to concerns that the right to silence will make clear confession impos-
sible, leading to a significant weakening of police effectiveness in criminal
investigation and crime prevention. For the same reason, the Chinese crim-
inal procedure law obliges suspects to answer questions truthfully (11) (Lewis
2011: 687-8), which contradicts the privilege against self-incrimination. 
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7. “全国人大常委会批准“禁止酷刑和其他残忍、不人道或有损人格的待遇或处罚公约”的
决定“ (Quanguo renda changweihui guanyu pizhun “Jinzhi kuxing he qita canren, bu rendao huo
you ru renge de daiyu huo chufa gongyue” de jueding, Decision of the Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress on the approval of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), 5 September 1988. The PRC voiced reservations
concerning Art. 20 and Art. 30(1) of the Convention against Torture.
8. See Ji Beibei, “Innocent man spent 11 years in jail,” Global Times, 10 May 2010, http://www.glob-
altimes.cn/content/529982.shtml (accessed on 6 February 2019).
9. In another case, She Xianglin was convicted of murdering his wife. However, his wife had simply
run away with another man to a different village and returned ten years later. Like Zhao Zuohai,
She Xianglin was tortured by police to confess a murder that never occurred. See “湖北杀妻冤
案 ” (Hubei shaqi yuan’an, The wife killing wrongful conviction case in Hubei Province),
http://news.sina.com.cn/z/hbshaqi/ (accessed on 5 February 2019); and Liu Li, “Wrongly Jailed
Man Freed after 11 Years,” China Daily, 14 April 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/
2005-04/14/content_434020.htm (accessed on 5 February 2019). For academic studies of wrong-
ful convictions in China, see He (2016). 
10. It’s common practice in China for these five organisations to jointly issue legal documents when
implementing certain new reforms involving multiple sectors, because each organisation has in-
fluence on its own subordinate organisations, and legal documents issued by a single organisation
are usually ignored by other organisations.
11. Art. 120 2018 CPL.
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Second, to compensate for the absence of the right to silence during in-
terrogation, China adopted a monitoring mechanism, i.e., audio or video
recording of interrogations (Chen 2011: 720). The 2012 CPL makes audio
or video recording mandatory for crimes punishable by death or life impris-
onment or other major crimes, and optional in other cases, (12) depending
mostly on the availability of recording devices. Some economically devel-
oped provinces have made it a mandatory rule to record all criminal inter-
rogations. Other less developed provinces are still struggling to implement
the mandatory requirements. Since the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury, a series of pilot projects, often supported by foreign donor organisa-
tions such as the Ford Foundation, have explored feasible ways to ensure
the legality and integrity of the interrogation process under China’s specific
political and legal circumstances. Other options, such as the presence of
lawyers during interrogation, have been tested for their effectiveness and
feasibility across China (Fan and Gu 2007). Many in the system have found
it premature (13) to allow a lawyer to be present during police interrogations,
but have accepted the alternative of audio or video recording of interroga-
tions. (14)
Third, the 2012 CPL also adopted some procedural requirements to reduce
the possibility of torture and coercive confessions (Ahl 2016: 149). For ex-
ample, the law requires a prompt transfer of criminal suspects to detention
centres after detention, because most incidents are carried out in a police
station (paichusuo 派出所) by police officers or even by security guards
(zhi’an lianfangyuan 治安联防员) (15). The 2012 CPL now provides that in-
terrogation should be conducted within a detention centre once the suspect
has been formally detained. (16) Clear rules and strict supervision over de-
tention centres have made it more difficult to torture suspects in detention.
As such, these procedural rules have played an important role in preventing
torture before detention or outside of detention centres. In practice, how-
ever, some suspects have not been promptly delivered to the detention cen-
tre after arrest, and other suspects have not been interrogated within the
detention centre but rather in the police station or in unlawful detention
venues. (17) Another violation of these rules occurs when police officers re-
move the suspect from the detention centre for interrogation on the pretext
of identifying the crime scene.
Highlights of the exclusionary rules
China’s exclusionary rules against illegally obtained evidence were drafted
by referring to common law confession rules and American exclusionary
rules against illegally obtained physical evidence. The drafting teams exten-
sively studied common practices and carefully considered foreign rules and
procedures in the drafting process. While most of the contents are in line
with the exclusionary rules of common law jurisdictions, the Chinese rules
also have some unique characteristics of their own.
First, the rules deﬁne the scope of both illegally obtained oral evidence
and illegally obtained physical evidence, and demand a compulsory ex-
clusion model for oral evidence, but merely demand a discretionary ex-
clusion model for physical evidence. (18) The broad scope of illegally
obtained evidence suggests China’s commitment (19) to fighting torture
and other illegal means of evidence collection. But at the same time, em-
phasis is placed on the exclusion of oral rather than physical evidence, re-
flecting a strong police objection to a substantive exclusionary rule and
the legislature’s aim to pursue substantial justice over procedural jus-
tice (20) (Lewis 2011: 664). 
Second, the rules impose the burden of proof on the prosecution and re-
quire the police to give oral testimony in court when necessary to prove
the legality of the evidence collection process. (21) In contrast, the defence
is only required to undertake the evidential burden of raising the issue of
the illegality of a piece of evidence when they move for its suppression. (22)
The allocation of the burden of proof for suppression hearings is in line with
international practice.
Third, it implies a standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” for sup-
pression hearings by providing that evidence should be suppressed when
doubts that the evidence was obtained unlawfully cannot be excluded. (23)
This standard of proof is as strict as that for a guilty verdict and suggests
the determination of the Chinese government to protect defendants from
being put in a disadvantageous position because of evidence obtained by
torture and other illegal means. The stricter the standard of proof, the more
difficult it is for the prosecution to prove the legality of evidence collection,
and the more protection the accused will enjoy. In setting the standard of
proof for excluding illegally obtained evidence, Chinese legislators knew that
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12. Art. 121 2012 CPL; Art. 123 2018 CPL.
13. Resistance came mainly from the police because of concerns that lawyers on site would interfere
with the interrogation and advise suspects not to cooperate with police.
14. In November 2005, the SPP issued the “Regulation on Whole-process Audio-recording and Video-
recording during People’s Procuratorate Interrogation of Suspects in Corruption Cases (Trial Im-
plementation),” and subsequently issued another three regulations applying to it in terms of
technical norms, technical working processes, and system construction norms. These indicate that
the procuratorate has begun to accept the supervision of audio and video recording. The 2012
CPL extends audio-recording and video-recording to all major crime cases, including capital cases
and cases punishable by life imprisonment. This means that audio-recording and video-recording
have been made compulsory for police action in major cases.
15. This was confirmed by all interviewees during empirical surveys.
16. A new paragraph was inserted as Paragraph 2 of Article 116: “Where investigators interrogate a
criminal suspect after s/he has been delivered into a detention facility, they should do so within
the detention facility.”
17. These data were obtained from interviews conducted in Beijing, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Yunnan, Jiangxi,
Guangdong, Shandong, and Zhejiang in 2013.
18. Article 54 of the 2012 CPL reads: “Confessions by a suspect or a defendant obtained through tor-
ture and extortion or other illegal means and witness testimonies and victim statements obtained
through the use of violence, threats, or other illegal means should be excluded. Where physical or
documentary evidence is collected in ways violating legal procedures and severely affecting ju-
dicial justice, corrections should be made or justiﬁcations provided. Where no correction or justiﬁ-
cation is provided, such evidence should be excluded.”
19. There were neither exclusionary rules of illegally obtained oral evidence nor exclusionary rules of
illegally obtained physical evidence before the 2010 Exclusionary Rules and 2012 CPL established
exclusionary rules of evidence covering both oral and physical evidence. Compared to common
law confession rules, the exclusion of oral evidence in China applies not only to confession, as
common law evidence rules do, but also to other oral evidence such as witness testimonies and
victim statements. All demonstrate the Chinese legislature’s determination to rule out illegally
obtained evidence of any kind.
20. The reason Chinese legislators attached more importance to the exclusion of illegally obtained
confessions is that such confessions may lead to wrongful convictions that affect substantial jus-
tice, but physical evidence, even if illegally obtained, won’t affect substantial justice. In China, al-
though academics have tried to promote the value of procedural justice, substantial justice always
prevails over procedural justice.
21. Article 57 reads: “During a court enquiry into the legality of the evidence collection process, the
people’s prosecutor’s office should prove the legality of the collection process. Where available
evidentiary materials are not able to prove the legality of evidence collection, the people’s pros-
ecutor’s office may request the people’s court to notify relevant investigators or other persons to
make an explanation before the court; the people’s court may also, at its own initiative, notify
relevant investigators or other persons to make an explanation before the court. The relevant in-
vestigators or other persons may themselves request to appear to make an explanation. Relevant
persons should appear upon the court’s notiﬁcation.”
22. Article 56 reads: “Where, in a court hearing, an adjudicator is of the opinion that illegally obtained
evidence under Article 54 may exist, a court enquiry should be conducted into the legality of
such evidence. A party and his defender or an agent ad litem has the right to apply to the people’s
court to exclude evidence obtained illegally. Where exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is ap-
plied for, relevant information or materials about the illegal practice should be furnished.”
23. Article 58 reads: “Where by means of a court hearing, evidence is determined to have been ob-
tained illegally or where situations of collecting evidence using illegal means provided under
Article 54 cannot be excluded, such evidence should be excluded.”
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proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not a mandatory requirement, but
still adopted this standard to strictly implement the exclusionary rules. (24)
Finally, a unique feature of China’s exclusionary rules is that they apply to
various actors in the criminal process. Police, prosecutors, and judges all
have the authority, and duty, for that matter, to exclude illegally obtained
evidence. (25) This feature seems absurd at first glance, but it is not surprising
considering the specific situation in China. China’s procuratorate has the
authority to exclude illegally obtained evidence because it is consistent with
its combined functions as both a prosecutorial agency and a legal supervi-
sory organ (Lewis 2011: 652). For the police, excluding illegally obtained
evidence serves a self-disciplinary, self-correcting function, reflecting in part
their superior political power in China, but the nature of the power is dif-
ferent from that of the procuratorate or courts. According to those involved
in drafting the exclusionary rules, any legislative process encounters un-
avoidable bartering of power as representatives of various organisations
fight for their own best interests. When the police representative saw the
courts and procuratorates gain the power to exclude illegally obtained ev-
idence collected by the police, they felt it necessary to ask for the same
power in order to avoid being inferior or losing face. 
The implementation of exclusionary rules in
China
General findings
Since the official establishment of the exclusionary rule, the initial reform
fervour has given way to the hard slog of changing actual practice. Empirical
studies and sporadic media reports indicate that the implementation of ex-
clusionary rules has encountered significant challenges due to various rea-
sons (see Li 2013; Sun and Biao 2014; Yang and Xu 2014; Wu 2014; Zuo
2015; Yi 2016; Guo 2017b). This part will share some general findings of
empirical research conducted by the author.
The empirical survey was conducted by the Centre for Criminal Law and
Justice (the Centre) at the China University of Political Science and Law
(CUPL) from October 2012 through December 2013. The Centre convened
17 workshops or symposiums in ten cities of seven provinces across
China. (26) More than 500 criminal judges, prosecutors, police officers, de-
fence lawyers, officials from judicial bureaus, and administrators from lawyer
associations at all levels participated in our survey. (27) Since most of the in-
formation we gathered from ﬁeld research was about implementation of
the exclusionary rules in courtrooms, the Centre also conducted a large-
scale questionnaire survey among prosecutors in the National Academy of
Prosecutors and two selected provinces as a supplementary resource to
learn how the exclusionary rules were implemented at the prosecution
stage. (28) The Centre also collected some relevant statistics, (29) around 50
typical cases, and several local implementing guidelines by means of ﬁeld
research and literature reviews.According to our empirical surveys, the main
focus of China’s exclusionary rules is the exclusion of illegally obtained con-
fessions. Up until 2013, almost all cases involving the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence were related to confession statements. The exclusion of
witness testimonies or victim statements was rare; and the exclusion of
physical evidence was non-existent (Guo 2017b). This finding was expected,
because China takes a tougher stance on exclusion of oral evidence than of
physical evidence, indicating that the dominant concern of the criminal jus-
tice system is the reliability rather than the legality of the evidence. 
Second, it is usually difficult for judges to accept claims of torture in ju-
dicial proceedings, to obtain genuine investigations by the procuratorate on
the claims, and finally to have illegally obtained evidence excluded in court.
The reasons are complicated. In some cases, judges were reluctant to ex-
clude illegally obtained evidence for fear that such a decision would ad-
versely affect their relationship with prosecutors or the police (Lewis 2011:
683). The Chinese criminal justice system includes a rigid performance eval-
uation system, according to which both the procuratorate and the police
will be negatively evaluated if a defendant is acquitted due to the exclusion
of illegally obtained evidence. Even if there is no acquittal resulting from
the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, police and/or prosecutors would
still be embarrassed and blame the court for their embarrassment. In other
cases, defendants failed to move for suppression because they did not have
defence lawyers, or their defence lawyers failed to do their job with dili-
gence. But the primary reason, according to the survey, is the vague and
often confusing legislation. Other reasons did exist, but they were not preva-
lent. Instead, complaints about vague legislation were heard everywhere. To
be specific, the current legislation does not provide clear and readily appli-
cable guidance for practitioners to implement the new rules. Confusion or
difficulties in implementing the exclusionary rules were regarded as the pri-
mary reasons for the lack of effectiveness of the exclusionary rules. 
Third, the exclusion of illegally obtained confessions has no impact on
conviction rates. In those rare cases that actually resulted in the exclusion
of illegally obtained evidence, very few such exclusions have resulted in the
acquittal of a defendant due to the issue of multiple confession statements.
Neither the 2010 Exclusionary Rule nor the 2012 CPL addresses the admis-
sibility of multiple or repeated confession statements. When a court ex-
cludes one or a portion of illegally obtained confessions, it can still rely on
the rest of the confession statements to find the defendant guilty. Without
excluding repeated confession statements that were contaminated by the
illegal statement, suppressing illegally obtained confessions becomes a
meaningless ritual, because there are usually multiple confession statements
in Chinese criminal cases due to repeated interrogations with varying de-
grees of credibility and legality.
Last but not least, the exclusionary rules have had an important influence
on interrogators’ mindset, despite the fact that it is difficult to initiate a
suppression hearing, few exclusions have taken place, and exclusions have
had little impact on the conviction rate. In response to the new legal regime,
interrogators (30) have started paying attention to the legality of their work
and are avoiding interrogation methods that could potentially be illegal and
subject to exclusionary rules when a case goes to trial. In the sense that the
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24. Interview with scholars who were involved in the drafting of 2010 Exclusionary Rules, Beijing, De-
cember 2013.
25. Art. 55 2012 CPL.
26. The surveyed sites include Beijing, Shaoxing City and Wenzhou City in Zhejiang Province, Nan-
chang City and Wuzhou City in Jiangxi Province, Changchun City in Jilin Province, Zigong City in
Sichuan Province, Shenzhen City in Guangdong Province, and Kunming City and the Chuxiong Yi
Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan Province.
27. We did not calculate the exact number of participants, but among them, police officers were less
represented because Chinese police are either too busy or reluctant to participate in academic
activities.
28. Surveyed sites included the National Academy of Prosecutors, which is a national training institute
for prosecutors, as well as the procuratorates of Shandong and Heilongjiang provinces.
29. By the time of our survey, there were very limited statistics regarding implementation of the ex-
clusionary rules, because no official statistics were available, and some local statistics were useless
due to lack of proper understanding of the rules.
30. We detected the change in their mindset through the questions they raised and our interactions
with them during the empirical surveys. 
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exclusionary rules may deter police from behaving improperly, the rules
have functioned well. However, like judges and prosecutors, the police are
also confused about the rules and the parameters of permissible interroga-
tion tactics. 
Problems with the implementation of the
exclusionary rules
Research in China has shown three legal challenges in implementing the
exclusionary rules. They are the scope of illegally obtained confessions
(Lewis 2011: 654); burden of proof and standard of proof in suppression
hearings; and the procedural rules for the hearings.
The scope of illegally obtained confessions
In most cases, failure to suppress an allegedly illegally obtained confession
results primarily from a misunderstanding as to what constitutes an illegally
obtained confession. Practitioners often run into difficulties in judging
whether a certain confession constitutes an illegally obtained confession
because neither the exclusionary rules nor the supporting judicial interpre-
tations give a clear definition or a full list of illegal means demanding ex-
clusion. Under the 2012 CPL, confessions by a suspect or a defendant
obtained through torture or other illegal means should be excluded. (31) But
it’s not clear what “other illegal means” are. Judicial interpretations by the
SPC and SPP have tried to give clearer guidance on “torture or other illegal
means” by referring to the deﬁnition of “torture” in the UN Convention
against Torture (UNCAT). (32) However, the definition offered by the UNCAT
is not precise, so making reference to it may even complicate the matter
by bringing in new concepts that also need to be defined. For example, the
SPC Interpretation provides:
[T]he use of corporal punishment or disguised corporal punishment,
or any other methods inﬂicting severe pain or suffering, physically
or mentally, on the defendant so as to force him/her to make con-
fessions against his or her will, shall be deemed “illegal means such
as extortion of confessions by torture” as set out in Article 54 of the
CPL. 
Without a clear definition and listings, it is hard for practitioners to un-
derstand what “disguised corporal punishment” refers to, not to mention
the obscure and subjective standards for “other methods inflicting severe
pain or suffering” on defendants. 
After extensive debates in China, Chinese academics and practitioners
reached a consensus on the following points: corporal punishment is used
interchangeably with the extortion of confessions by torture according to
empirical findings. But since the implementation of the 2010 Exclusionary
Rules, corporal punishment and torture have rarely been observed, if still in
existence. Rather, it is disguised corporal punishment that has been fre-
quently employed in response to a strict prohibition of corporal punishment.
Thus, determining what constitutes disguised corporal punishment and sup-
pressing confessions obtained by such means has become the most chal-
lenging task. Many agree that any methods inflicting severe physical pain
on the defendant should fall under the umbrella of disguised corporal pun-
ishment, such as sleep deprivation, hunger, heat, cold, or stress positions
during interrogations, because these measures challenge suspects’ limits,
cause physical and psychological suffering, and can be used to extract con-
fessions from suspects even more readily than corporal punishment. The
2013 SPC Opinion on Preventing Wrongful Convictions echoes that con-
sensus by explicitly providing in Article 8 that confessions obtained by tor-
ture or other illegal means including cold, hunger, heat, and sleep deprivation
should be excluded. (33) Another difficulty relates to deﬁning prolonged in-
terrogation. Although there is no denying that confessions obtained by pro-
longed interrogation should be excluded as illegally obtained evidence, no
uniform guidance exists to guide practitioners in determining how many
hours constitute “prolonged” or under what circumstances an interrogation
can be regarded as “prolonged.” 
It is even more challenging to define disguised corporal punishments in-
ﬂicting mental suffering, which usually refers to threats, inducements, or
deception in the context of China. Although threats, inducements, and de-
ception have been strictly forbidden together with the extortion of confes-
sions by torture in criminal interrogations since the very ﬁrst CPL, Chinese
academics and practitioners have clashed over whether confessions ob-
tained by threats, inducements, or deception should be excluded. Threats
can take any form, including the use of violence or embarrassing revelations,
the use of compulsory measures or sanctions upon the spouse or children
of the accused, the refusal to provide medicine for accused with chronic
diseases, etc. Threats amount to torture according to UNCAT’s definition, (34)
and since it generates mental suffering, confessions obtained by threats
should be a category for exclusion as a matter of principle. The problem is
whether any exception should be allowed when the threat is only minor
and constitutes weak evidence instead of illegally obtained evidence (Guo
2017a: 36; Guo 2017b: 58). 
Inducement and deception are different from threats. On the one hand,
neither is explicitly included in the deﬁnition of torture in UNCAT. On the
other hand, it is not easy to distinguish blameworthy inducement or de-
ception from regular interrogation tactics in practice (Guo 2017a: 37; Guo
2017b: 58). It is still premature for China to provide a categorical exclusion
for all confessions obtained by inducement or deception. Again, it could be
hard to draw a line between blameworthy inducement/deception and those
permissible as interrogation strategies.
Another challenge in defining illegally obtained confessions involves con-
fessions obtained in violation of procedural rules. Many agree that it is not
necessary to exclude all the confessions in violation of any procedural rules
(Lewis 2011: 662). Instead, only those confessions obtained in violation of
procedural rules concerning human rights should be excluded (Guo 2017a:
38; Guo 2017b: 60). For example, as the SPC Opinion on Preventing Wrong-
ful Convictions provides, except in emergency cases where an interrogation
has to be conducted on site at detention facilities, confessions obtained
outside the places provided by law, confessions obtained without being
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31. Art. 54 2012 CPL.
32. Art. 95 SPC Judicial Interpretation; Art. 65 SPP Judicial Interpretation.
33. See “最高人民法院关于建立健全防范刑事冤假错案工作机制的意见” (Zuigao renmin
fayuan guanyu jianli jianquan fangfan xingshi yuanjia cuo’an gongzuo jizhi de yijian, The SPC
opinion on preventing wrongful convictions), 9 October 2013, http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=436610 (accessed on 5 February 2019).
34. According to the deﬁnition of torture in UNCAT, “For the purposes of this Convention, the term
‘torture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inten-
tionally inﬂicted on a person for such purposes as (…) intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is in-
ﬂicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.” Intimidating or coercing means threats in this context. China
has ratiﬁed the UNCAT and should adopt the whole concept of torture into domestic law.
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audio or video-recorded in accordance with law, and confessions that may
have been obtained by illegal means should all be excluded. The procedural
rules on the permissible location of interrogation and the requirement for
audio-taping or video-taping interrogations are important because they
share the purpose of protecting suspects from being tortured outside a law-
ful interrogation venue or off tape. 
The last challenge is the admissibility of multiple confessions. As men-
tioned earlier, there will be no point in excluding illegally obtained confes-
sions if contaminated repeat confessions are still admissible. To solve this
problem, the Chinese legislature has to adopt the “fruit of the poisonous
tree” doctrine and address the admissibility of multiple confessions (Guo
2017a: 39; Guo 2017b: 62). 
Burden of proof and standard of proof 
It is a globally common practice to invert the burden of proof in estab-
lishing whether certain evidence is illegally obtained. China has adopted
this international practice in the 2010 Exclusionary Rules and 2012 CPL.
Under Article 57 of the 2012 CPL, the burden is on the prosecution to prove
the lawfulness of a confession if the defendant’s motion to suppress has
aroused suspicion in the mind of the judge. Meanwhile, China’s exclusionary
rules also impose a minimal onus on the defence to provide “supporting
leads or materials” on the “person(s), time, place, manner, and content” of
alleged illegal means to avoid groundless motions for suppression. However,
the empirical survey revealed that many practitioners mistakenly believed
that the defence must prove the illegality of the challenged confessions.
On the other hand, in cases where practitioners correctly understood the
allocation of burden of proof for suppression hearings, prosecutors com-
plained of encountering enormous difficulties in proving the lawfulness of
interrogation procedures due to the scarcity of relevant evidence. 
There is also a lot of misunderstanding concerning the standard of proof
for suppression hearings (Lewis 2011: 654). Under Article 58 of the 2012
CPL, after a hearing, if the court conﬁrms that the evidence was secured il-
legally or cannot rule out that possibility, the court should suppress the ev-
idence. Its complex and confusing wording has led to diverse interpretations
of this clause. According to our empirical survey, most practitioners paid
more attention to the ﬁrst part of this provision and concluded that evi-
dence should be suppressed only when the court conﬁrms it was seized il-
legally. Academics read this provision in different ways. One representative
understanding is that the clause has two alternative limbs: one is “conﬁrm-
ing the existence of illegal evidence,” while the other is “cannot eliminate
the possibility of illegally obtaining evidence” (Chen and Guo 2014). Ac-
cording to the questionnaire survey, a potential problem with the “conﬁrm-
ing” standard was that it risked shifting the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the defence or even to the court. Under the second limb,
the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that confessions
were lawfully obtained. This unrealistically strict standard of proof, even if
it could be satisﬁed in some exceptional cases, has had trouble gaining a
foothold in practice. All in all, “conﬁrmed” by the court or otherwise, there
should be only one standard of proof: that is proof beyond reasonable doubt
by the prosecution. Although some scholars have suggested lowering this
standard to a preponderance of the evidence, my concern is that the less
strict standard of proof would make it easier for the prosecution to prove
the legality of evidence collection procedures and more difficult for the de-
fence to successfully move for suppression.
Procedures for suppression
Compared with the exclusionary principle adopted by judicial interpreta-
tions for the 1996 CPL, the 2010 Exclusionary Rules and the 2012 CPL pro-
visions on exclusionary rules provide more procedural specificities for
suppression hearings. However, this legislation is not sufficient to guide
practice on several procedural issues (Guo 2017a: 34; Guo 2017b: 54). For
example, should a pre-trial conference be considered an important occasion
to seriously consider the admissibility of confessions, or is it merely an oc-
casion for the court to hear evidence and submissions from both parties?
Must a motion for suppression be ﬁled during the pre-trial conference?
Should defendants be required to participate in the pre-trial conference?
Should the pre-trial conference be open to the public? (35) What kind of
model should China adopt: separate hearing, trial-within-trial, or out-of-
court investigation? Should court rulings on suppression hearings be in-
cluded in the ﬁnal court judgments? Exclusionary rules are a sophisticated
tool that judges use to ensure the fairness of the criminal process and main-
tain the integrity of the criminal justice system. That system has evolved
over a long historical period in Western countries to reach its maturity.
China imported the system from the outside world and started from
scratch. It needs practice, incubation, and sometimes experience for the sys-
tem to grow and to become meaningful. To pass legislation in response to
a crisis is easy, but the hard task is to implement it. 
It is noteworthy that the 2018 Supervision Law (36) clearly states in its Ar-
ticle 33 that supervisory commissions should meet the requirements and
standards of a criminal trial when they collect, preserve, examine, and use
evidence. Evidence obtained by illegal means should be excluded and cannot
be used as the basis of case disposal. It’s clear that the exclusionary rules
apply to supervisory commissions’ investigation of corruption crimes, but
it’s not clear if they apply to supervisory commissions’ investigation of Party
discipline violations or administrative violations.
Further reforms to strictly implement
exclusionary rules
It is publicly acknowledged that the exclusionary rules have not been
strictly implemented. There are multiple reasons why exclusionary rules are
not working in China. First, traditional mindsets still dominate among prac-
titioners (Guo 2017a: 50; Guo 2017b: 75; Lewis 2011: 696), and the protec-
tion of human rights remains a marginal concern in the Chinese criminal
process. 
Second, practical obstacles exist to prevent the exclusionary rules from
being strictly implemented (Guo 2017a: 50; Guo 2017b: 75). The soaring
number of motions for suppression ﬁled by defence lawyers and the accused
since the 2010 Exclusionary Rules were enacted has placed criminal justice
agencies under tremendous pressure. A motion to exclude illegally obtained
evidence necessarily means defendants withdrawing interrogation confes-
sions, the allegation of torture or other illegal means to obtain the confes-
sion, and the failure of the prosecution to supervise investigations. It is well
known that the police, prosecutors, and courts would be on the alert for
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35. These questions were all raised by practitioners though our empirical surveys.
36. The Supervision Law was adopted in March 2018. The new law integrates supervisory power that
was formerly divided among three agencies – the Party disciplinary agencies, administrative su-
pervisory agencies, and procuratorates, and forms a centralised, unified, and efficient state super-
visory system.
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the filing of a motion for suppression and would even work together to
overturn the motion. They therefore collaborate rather than check each
other in solving the case (Lewis 2011: 689-90). Many failures of legal reform
can be traced to this abnormal institutional relationship, and a serious de-
bate is ongoing over how to readjust the relationship among the police,
prosecutors, and courts (Wang and Sun 2010).
Third, the lack of effective – or any – defence by lawyers contributes to
the deteriorating implementation of the exclusionary rules (Guo 2017b:
76). Recent national statistics on defence lawyers indicate that criminal de-
fendants were represented by lawyers in only 20.2% of all cases in 2015. (37)
The empirical survey also found that many defence lawyers lack training
and therefore fail to perform their duty when they raise the issue on their
clients’ behalf and try to have the evidence in question suppressed. 
Last but not least, there are some loopholes in the current legislation (Guo
2017b: 76). The 2010 Exclusionary Rule and CPL merely provide a general
framework for the rules. They should be supplemented by more detailed
and concrete procedures or guidance to make the rules more operable. For
example, the law should make clear what constitutes “illegal means” so that
the police know what they can and cannot do during interrogation. China
should also adopt the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine and exclude
tainted derivative evidence (Ahl 2016: 52, 146). Otherwise, the exclusion
of illegally obtained evidence is meaningless. 
Besides the reasons mentioned above, China’s legislative model makes
it diffcult to implement and improve this rule. Unlike common law juris-
dictions, China does not have a case law tradition. As a statutory law state,
China confronts a paradox: legislation should predate implementation,
but the need for legislation will not emerge until it is implemented. The
exclusionary rules reﬂect the tension between the evolution of the law
and China’s tradition of a rigid, hysteretic statutory law. A possible solution
could be issuing guidance piece by piece. The SPC Opinion on Preventing
Wrongful Convictions (9 October 2013) sets a good example for this ap-
proach. As mentioned earlier, the SPC Opinion on Preventing Wrongful
Convictions has absorbed some agreed understandings on exclusionary
rules. It lists some common disguised corporal punishments such as cold,
hunger, heat, and sleep deprivation, and makes it clear that confessions
obtained outside of places provided by law, and confessions obtained
without being audio- or video-recorded in accordance with law, etc., shall
all be excluded. 
Realising that more detailed, clear, and readily applicable guidance is
needed to ﬂesh out the exclusionary rules, the third Criminal Tribunal of
the SPC in 2014 started drafting implementing guidelines on excluding
illegally obtained evidence. The guidelines did not come out until June
2017. On 27 June 2017, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Secu-
rity, and the Ministry of Justice jointly released “Provisions on Several Is-
sues Regarding the Strict Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal
Cases” (hereinafter the Provisions), which are the national implementation
guidelines. 
Pros and cons of the Provisions
Changes made by the Provisions are generally positive, but there is still
room for further improvement. The Provisions provide a clearer definition
of illegally obtained evidence, adopt “the fruit of the poisonous tree” doc-
trine, add removal registry and medical inspection records as the prosecu-
tion’s means of proof, reiterate the requirement of interrogation recordings,
and clarify the procedure for suppression hearings. However, the Provisions
have not solved the problem of the defence lawyer’s capacity to request
suppression, which existed in the previous rules.
First, in response to the criticism of the vagueness of the definition, the
Provisions spare a couple of articles trying to clarify what are illegally ob-
tained confessions. Article 2 seems to set up three criteria for illegally ob-
tained confessions. The first criterion is the use of illegal means, i.e., violent
methods and disguised corporal punishment. Violent methods include hit-
ting and the unlawful use of restraints. (38) The Provisions do not provide a
full list of disguised corporal punishments, but read together with Article 3,
disguised corporal punishments should include threats. (39) According to Ar-
ticle 3, threats could include the threat of using violence, or of seriously
harming the lawful rights and interests of the person or their families. These
provisions accept the academic consensus on the admissibility of confes-
sions acquired by threats. They do not mention inducement and deception,
echoing the divided opinions on the admissibility of confessions obtained
by such measures. The second criterion is unbearable suffering. Although
it’s a subjective test and difficult to measure in practice, this is a threshold
for the use of violence or disguised corporal punishment and will help prac-
titioners distinguish illegal means from merely improper practice. The third
criterion is voluntariness. Both Article 2 and 3 mention “against their own
will,” and this seems to adopt voluntariness as a criterion to determine
whether a certain confession should be excluded. Article 4 makes it clear
that any illegal restriction of physical liberty, especially unlawful confine-
ment, constitutes illegal means deserving suppression. (40) Unlawful restric-
tion of physical liberty constitutes illegal means because the accused may
not confess voluntarily when his/her liberty is illegally restricted, and he is
under tremendous psychological pressure. Confessions obtained in such
cases should also be excluded because that violates procedural rules. In a
word, confessions obtained through violence or disguised corporal punish-
ments such as threats should be suppressed if the illegal means cause un-
bearable suffering and cause suspects or defendants to confess against their
own will.
Second, in response to the issue of multiple confessions, the Provisions
adopt a restricted version of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. As
discussed earlier, admitting repeated confessions would make the exclusion
of illegally obtained confessions meaningless. Therefore, Article 5 states:
Where extortion of confessions by torture is used to make criminal
suspects or defendants confess, and the criminal suspect makes sub-
sequent repeat confessions similar to that confession because of the
influence of that [prior] use of torture to extract confessions, they
shall all be excluded together, with the following exceptions:
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37. Wang Lüsheng 王禄生, “刑事诉讼法实施效果评估：基于350万份刑事判决书的大数据分
析” (Xingshi susongfa shishi xiaoguo pinggu: jiyu 350 wan fen xingshi panjueshu de da shuju fenxi,
Evaluation of the effect of implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law: A big data analysis of
3,500,000 criminal verdicts), unpublished paper presented at the Junior Scholar Workshop on
Criminal Justice Empirical Research Methodology, Macau, September 2016.
38. Statements shall be excluded where made by criminal suspects or defendants against their own
will due to unbearable suffering caused by the employment of the egregious tactic of using violent
methods such as hitting, the unlawful use of restraints, or disguised corporal punishment.
39. Art. 3: “Statements shall be excluded where made by criminal suspects or defendants against their
own will due to unbearable suffering caused by methods of threats of using violence, or carrying
out threats through means such as seriously harming the lawful rights and interests of the person
or their families.” 
40. Art. 4: “Statements of criminal suspects or defendants gathered by the use of unlawful confine-
ment or other illegal restrictions of physical liberty shall be excluded.”
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(1) Where, during the investigation period, the investigating organs
confirm, or cannot rule out, that evidence was gathered by illegal
means, and they therefore change investigators; and when other in-
vestigators again conduct interrogation, give information on the pro-
cedural rights and on the legal consequences of admitting guilt, and
the criminal suspect voluntarily confesses.
(2) Where, during the periods of review for arrest, review for prose-
cution, and trial, prosecutors or adjudicators give information on pro-
cedural rights and the legal consequences of admitting guilt when
conducting interrogations, and the criminal suspect or defendant vol-
untary confesses.
It is a great leap to adopt the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, but
there is a lot of concern about the first exception. Many worry that the in-
fluence will still exist even after the replacement of interrogators.
Third, in response to the scarcity of proof for the prosecution, the Provi-
sions bring in additional means of proof: the removal registry for interroga-
tion (41) and medical inspection records. (42) The prosecution could present
the removal registry and medical inspection records to prove that no illegal
means were employed during the interrogations at issue. For those existing
means of proof, Article 11 emphasises, where an audio-visual recording is
made of the interrogation process, it shall be without interruptions and with
its integrity preserved. Also, it must not be selectively recorded and must
not be spliced or edited.
Lastly, the Provisions flesh out the procedural rules for suppression hear-
ings. Based on experience in practice, a notification procedure is required
during either the review for arrest, the review for prosecution, or before
trial. (43) The accused should be informed of the right to apply for the exclu-
sion of illegally obtained evidence. This is especially significant to those
without the assistance of a defence lawyer. 
To clarify the confusion over whether suppression should occur in the pre-
trial conference or in the main hearing, the Provisions make it clear that
the court shall not suppress illegally obtained evidence until the main hear-
ing. (44) However, if the prosecution and the defence can reach an agreement
on the admissibility of alleged illegally obtained evidence, this issue could
be solved in the pre-trial conference. (45)
The Provisions also make trial-within-trial the primary model for suppres-
sion hearings. According to Article 30, when during the trial period the court
decides to conduct an investigation of the legality of evidence gathering, it
shall first conduct an investigation in court. However, in order to prevent
excessive delay of the trial, the court may also conduct the investigation
before the end of the court session. Out-of-court investigation is obviously
not allowed anymore.
In conclusion, the Provisions respond to many issues raised in the practice
of implementing the exclusionary rules since 2010, and make some progress
by absorbing matured opinions. They provide a more detailed and readily
applicable guidance for practitioners to strictly implement exclusionary
rules. But there are still some problems with the Provisions, the most striking
of which is defence lawyers’ incapacity to suppress illegally obtained con-
fessions. According to Article 22, it’s the decision of state authorities
whether to collect relevant evidence that can prove the illegality of evi-
dence collection, and defence lawyers have no access to the evidence with-
out the approval of the state authorities. (46) This will make it difficult for
the defence to either initiate a suppression hearing or have the illegally ob-
tained evidence excluded.
Another problem is that judges’ opinions can be tainted by excluded con-
fessions because Article 17 mistakenly provides that “illegal evidence that
has been excluded shall be transferred with the case and be specified as il-
legal evidence excluded in accordance with law.” This provision is in conflict
with another provision in the same guidance. Section 2 of Article 33 pro-
vides that the evidence in question cannot be presented and confronted
before the court makes the final decision on whether suppression should
be granted. The purpose of Section 2 of Article 33 is to avoid the contami-
nation of a judge’s conviction by evidence excluded thereafter.
Conclusion
As a complex legal institution concerning substantive law, procedural law,
and evidence law, exclusionary rules are the most controversial rules in all
of criminal law (Goodpaster 1982: 1082). Therefore, it is not easy to make
the rules, especially in a country without a case law tradition. It is even
harder to implement exclusionary rules due to resistance from traditional
culture and mindset, practical obstacles, and insufficient legislation. How-
ever, China has been making efforts to put these rules into practice since
2010. Although it is necessary to continue improving the rules, the most
important task for the moment is to strictly implement the exclusionary
rules. Further training should be provided to help practitioners nationwide
to correctly understand the exclusionary rules. Suppression hearings should
be initiated whenever the defence moves for suppression and fulfils his obli-
gation of presenting necessary information. The prosecution should use all
relevant means to prove the legality of evidence collection “beyond rea-
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41. Detention centres shall make a registry of persons being taken to interrogation, specifying the
unit, personnel, matter, and start and stop times, as well as the criminal suspect’s name and other
such information.
42. Detention centres receiving criminal suspects into custody shall conduct physical inspections.
When making inspections, the people’s procuratorate’s procurators who are based in the detention
centres may be present. Where the inspection discover that the criminal suspect has injuries or
physical abnormalities, the detention centres shall take photographs or recordings and have the
personnel bringing them for detainment, and the criminal suspect, explain the reasons separately,
have this clearly written in the physical inspection record, and have it signed and verified by the
personnel delivering the detainees, the person receiving them into custody, and the criminal sus-
pects.
43. Article 16 provides: “Criminal suspects interrogated during the review for arrest and review for
prosecution periods shall be informed that they have the right to apply for the exclusion of illegal
evidence and be informed of their procedural rights and the legal consequences of admitting
guilt.” Art. 23: “When people’s courts deliver a copy of the indictment to defendants and their
defenders, they shall inform them of the right to apply for the exclusion of illegal evidence.”
44. Article 26 states: “Where the public prosecutor, defendant, and his defender fail to reach a con-
sensus on the legality of evidence gathering during the pretrial conference, and the people’s court
has doubts about the legality of the evidence gathering, it shall conduct an investigation during
trial; (…)”
45. Art. 25: “Where defendants and their defenders apply for the exclusion of illegal evidence before
the court opens for trial, and provide leads or materials in accordance with the relevant legal pro-
visions, the people’s courts shall convene a pretrial conference. People’s procuratorates shall make
focused explanations of the legality of evidence gathering through means such as the presentation
of relevant evidentiary materials. The people’s courts may verify the circumstances and hear com-
ments. – The people’s procuratorate may decide to withdraw the relevant evidence; and evidence
that is withdrawn must not be presented in court absent new reasoning. – Defendants and their
defenders may withdraw applications for the exclusion of illegal evidence. After the withdrawal
of the application, they must not again submit an application for the exclusion of the relevant
evidence, absent new leads or materials.”
46. Where criminal suspects or defendants, as well their defenders, apply to the people’s courts or
people’s procuratorates to collect audio-visual interrogation recordings, physical inspection
records, or other evidentiary materials that the public security organs, state security organs, or
people’s procuratorates gathered but have not handed over, and, upon review, the people’s court
or people’s procuratorate finds that the evidence that the criminal suspect or defendant or their
defenders applied for collection of is related to proving the legality of evidence gathering, they
shall collect it; where they find it is not related to proving the legality of evidence gathering, they
shall decide not to collect it, and explain the reasons to the criminal suspect or defendant and
their defender. 
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sonable doubt.” The courts should exclude illegally obtained evidence,
whether exclusion will lead to acquittal or not. Not until all of the above
goals are met can the exclusionary rules play their role in both preventing
wrongful convictions and protecting the human rights of the accused. 
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